At a given point in time, demographic projections have a greater degree of usability than the data derived from most other crystal ball gazing. For example, calculating historical returns in the stock market is heavily influenced by the starting point; it is possible to go for twenty years with a subpar compound return, even when the much longer pattern shows attractive results.  Weather forecasters have become much better in telling us of near-term conditions, but demographers still have them beat from a long-term standpoint. The reason is fairly simple: a person of a certain age has a high probability of becoming a year older in the next 365 days, and thirty years older in three decades, and so forth.

The data below, compiled from information reported by the Pew Hispanic Research Center, the Wall Street Journal, and the New York Times, thus tell a story that is not connected to future immigration policy nor likely to be altered by any sudden seismic shifts in birth or mortality rates, even with some interesting changes happening therein.

As the population numbers unfold, within the next quarter century, the United States will in all probability not have any ethnic majority. The multiple minority description will become accurate nationally as it already is in certain age categories in certain geographies.

Considering the relationship of population composition to political power, the “only” question of importance then is whether power will transfer peacefully. Most historians would have a fair amount of skepticism. And for sure, some will point to the election of Donald Trump as a sign that this country is in for a series of difficult confrontations. Extremists might say that a curtain hiding an American myth (superiority gained ethically) will be pulled back and our warts will be evident for all to see. Our best days could be thought to be behind us, without even considering our relative standing globally.

Against this gloomy picture, the dollar remains the strongest currency extant and people around the world want to come here for jobs, freedom of speech, and a greater sense of personal security. Hence those predicting a decline in America’s position have to be looking at an important change from the present condition. But that is what they pay experts for, to tell us the future will be different from the past. Hopefully (for their jobs) they will be more accurate than the pollsters who erred big-time on Brexit, Santos, and Trump.

In this regard, a naïve person might think that demographic data would be supportive, or at least suggestive, of specific policy recommendations. However, in the current anti-intellectual cauldron which exists in many strata of the American population, beginning with an odd duality — the very top of our political structure and our college campuses in many cases — data-free pontification is the norm, often accompanied by more virulent threats than simply “you do not understand.”

Anyway, maybe it would help to begin with a series of demographic observations, loosely lumped under the headings of Population, Societal, and Economics.  And leaving aside interesting conversations about metrics of success – some combination of peace, economic enhancement, and happiness would seem apropos – just for kicks, let’s categorize these data points as negative (N), positive (P), no real change (NRC), or simply different (SD), recognizing there would be much debate over the word “simply.”

POPULATION

• Of people at least 85 years of age, 82% are white, 18% non-white. For each five-year age bracket downward, the former number declines and the latter rises. At the 0-5 year-old age level, the split is basically 50%-50%. SD
• Growth in population is the lowest since that of the Great Depression. N
• More whites are dying than are being born in 1/3 of states. SD
• There is a decline in the number of white women in child-bearing age and they are having fewer babies per woman. SD
• Some 65% of immigrants are 25-64 years of age, compared with 52% of the native born population; a mere 5% are over 65 years old, one-third of the rate for the native-born sector. SD

• In the next two decades, the number of people > 70 years of age will double to 60 million. N
• At age 65, men live 19 years more; women 21 years. NRC
• According to Pew, the foreign born portion of the population will be 18% in 2065, up from 14% in 2015. The second generation category will be 18%, up from 12%. The white population will be 46%, down from 62% in 2015. SD
• Over 40% of American births are to unmarried U.S.-born women. N
• Millennials are 31% of the white population, 44% of the Hispanic population. (The largest single age cohort overall is that of 26 year-olds, 4.8 million.) SD

SOCIETAL

• One-fifth of 25-32 year-olds have no father figure in their lives and one-quarter of young adults lack an active relationship with more than one parent. N
• While there is a rising percentage of individuals who have never married or who are divorced or separated, still in their first marriage are 69% of college graduates. However, this is nearly double the 38% rate for those who did not finish high school. N
• In the 1950s, 20% of households moved within a year; this level was true as recently as 1985. Now the number is 10%, a reflection of both economics and cultural balkanization. SD

• For the first time in 130 years, 18-34 year-olds are slightly more likely to live with their parents than with a spouse or partner in their own house. SD
• In 1972, 46% of those surveyed believed that “most people could be trusted.” In 2016: 31%. N
• In 1967, 3% of newlyweds were intermarried; now, it is 17%. SD

ECONOMICS

• Compensation levels for half of 30 year-olds are the same as those of their parents; in 1970, 90% were above. Offspring overall no longer believe they will out-earn their parents. N
• People 65-75 years of age have five times the debt of twenty years ago. N
• The net worth of 55-64 year-olds (middle quintile) in 2013 was $168,900, barely above the inflation-adjusted $175,300 of 1989. Some 44% had debt, versus 30% in 1998. N
• Home ownership rate is at a 50-year low; there is an increasing percentage of home rentals, now at 37%, up from 31% in 2006. In 1965, it was 37% also. (Much of the increase represents a lifestyle decision, as rent can be greater than the cost of a mortgage.) SD
• One-quarter of millennials reportedly have delayed buying a house because of student debt. N

• Affluent parents are pouring money into the away-from-school category of education. Not unrelated, some 70% of kids at the top 200 colleges are from the top income quartile. NRC
• Of 18-64 year-olds, 55% have full-time jobs. One-fifth of men of this age are on Medicaid. N
• Half of American jobs pay $37,000 or less per year, including 25% with compensation under $23,000. (For comparison, a family of four at $32,000 qualifies for SNAP benefits. In contrast, the top 20% of income recipients earn $200,000 per year on average.) N
• Mothers are the primary breadwinners in 25% of households. SD
• Some 46% of households with mother and father in the house have both employed full-time. N
• In 1973, median income, inflation adjusted, of men working full-time was $54,030. In 2016, that figure is only $51,640. N

Dear Editor: I realize that individual essays could be written about all of the data points listed above, another time perhaps. Similarly, to try to envision say, the year 2050, and work backwards based on demographic inputs to arrive at cogent comments about “what then shall we do today” is beyond my capability. My bet is that most people do not have in their heads the bullet point information above, so this essay may be considered a public service (just joking).